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BROADBAND APPLICATIONS TO E-HEALTH: (C) INFORMATION

CONSUMERS, ALRC PRIVACY PRINCIPLES AND
THE 2010 HEALTHCARE IDENTIFIERS ACT
Jennifer Heath
University of Wollongong
Aspects of the 2010 Healthcare Identifiers Act (HIA) are compared to the Australian Law
Reform Commission (ALRC) Unified Privacy Principles. The opportunity for improved
healthcare delivery through the enabling healthcare identifiers is acknowledged and discussion
moves beyond such justifications to consideration of broader implications for Australian
society. Law Academic Roger Magnusson’s three broad, sequential conceptual shifts in health
privacy provide a framework for the discussion. Lost opportunities for Australian consumers
are also highlighted.

INTRODUCTION
The introduction of electronic health records (EHR) has proven to be a challenge in Australia,
as it has elsewhere in the world (Kalra 2006; Baird et al 2011; Gunter and Terry 2005;
Hayrinen et al 2008; Ludwick et al 2010). Healthcare professionals strongly argue the case for
EHR in terms of the benefits to both individual healthcare consumers and society as a whole.
(National Electronic Health Records Taskforce 2000) An important step towards the
introduction of the Australian EHR was undertaken in 2010 with the passing of the Healthcare
Identifiers Act (HIA) through the Australian Parliament.
In parallel to the above developments in the health care sector the Australian Law Reform
Commission (ALRC) has wrestled with the concept of privacy in the Information Age.
Following extensive consultation with community members, policy and law makers the
ALRC proposed a set of eleven Unified Privacy Principles (UPPs) for Australia. (ALRC
2008) The main objective was to unify and enhance the provision of the Commonwealth
sector Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) and the private sector National Privacy
Principles (NPPs).
The UPPs moved through consultation to become the final thirteen exposure draft Australian
Privacy Principles (APPs). Health related provisions that were previously covered by IPPs
and NPPs are, however, not covered by the APPs. The Healthcare identifiers and privacy:
Discussion paper on proposals for legislative support (2009) referred to the UPPs and
included them as an appendix. Table 1 provides a timeline to illustrate the parallel journey
these two important national endeavours have taken over the last few years.
The release of the Exposure Australian Privacy Principles came 11 months after the release
of the healthcare identifiers and privacy discussion paper. The Healthcare Identifiers Act was
finalised in the month following release of the exposure APPs. The Australian Government is
yet to release law reform proposals to deal with specific privacy protections for information
relating to health. (Companion Guide to APPs 2010, 4)
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As the APPs have not yet been finalised, and given that the UPPs did not aim to exclude
health care provisions and they were used in the healthcare identifiers discussion paper, they
are used in this paper to facilitate discussion.
Published

Document

May 2008

Australian Law Reform Commission Model Unified Privacy
Principles.

July 2009

Healthcare identifiers and privacy: Discussion paper on proposals for
legislative support.

June 2010

Exposure Australian Privacy Principles + Companion Guide to
Australian Privacy Principles.
Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010.

July 2010

Due July
2011

Draft released for comment: in mid Dec 2009, Submissions closed: 7
Jan 2010.
Senate Committee report on Exposure Australian Privacy Principles.

Table 1 - Influential documents in two parallel activities with national importance: ALRC Privacy and health sector
identifiers.

In contrast to the Australian approach the US Government reserved support for a unique,
national health identifier until Congress had enacted comprehensive legislation to protect
consumer privacy. (Ng 2000)
This paper highlights several tension points regarding privacy in these Australian national
endeavours. It moves the discussion beyond the EHR objectives to consider Magnusson’s
“mother of all function creeps” and broader societal impacts.

MAGNUSSON’S 3 CONCEPTUAL SHIFTS IN HEALTH
PRIVACY
Roger Magnusson argues that the challenges to health information privacy are best
understood by considering three very broad, sequential conceptual shifts from a relationship
between a single clinician and a patient, to more complex scenarios with multiple clinicians
(Magnusson 2004). The essential components of the health information privacy transitions
perceived by Magnusson are summarised below.

CONCEPT 1: PATIENT-CENTRED HEALTH RECORDS
Clinical care is delivered by a sole practitioner who receives or generates sensitive
information during the care of a patient/consumer. Information is stored on hardcopy health
records. Protection of confidentiality within the bilateral doctor/patient relationship is
paramount. The hardcopy nature of the health record aids in restricting access to the
consumer’s information. The clinician consults with the patient in the ‘gatekeeper’ role,
seeking consent where necessary to release records for secondary purposes, meaning those
purposes that do not pertain to the direct delivery of healthcare to an individual. (Safran et al.
2006)
Within this paradigm, the law focuses on offering consumers protection by imposing penalties
on the doctor for unauthorised disclosure of personal information.
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CONCEPT 2: MULTI-FUNCTION HEALTH DATA HOLDINGS
Clinical care is typically delivered in a “corporate” environment including hospitals, medical
centres and community-based practice groups. Patient information is recorded in a
centralised, shared record which can be accessed by a range of clinicians and administrators.
The need for specialised and efficient care results in many team members widely accessing
the individual’s health record. In institutional contexts the treating physician does not broker
access to patient records. There will rarely be a single ‘gatekeeper’ allowing access.
Within this paradigm, the focus of the law shifts from protecting confidentiality in a
relationship to protecting the actual medical information.
On the shift from bilateral to multilateral confidentiality Magnusson states:
‘The growth of computers and the revolution in information technology has made
this transition inevitable. Privacy legislation goes beyond confidentiality to regulate
other elements of the “information processing cycle”; namely the collection of
personal information, its accuracy, security and storage; the right of the subject to
access it, as well as use and disclosure’ (Magnusson 2004, 683)

CONCEPT 3: TRANS-ORGANISATIONAL HEALTH DATA FLOWS
Patient health records are stored in electronic health records in a manner to facilitate national
linkage and potentially more surveillance. Management of privacy extends beyond one
organisation’s health care environment. In Australia this includes the national health
insurance scheme, Medicare, General Practitioners and Super-Clinics, prescriptions details
held in the Pharmaceutical Benefits System, private health insurance organisations, public and
private hospitals and allied health agencies.
The argument for electronic health records, which characterise Magnusson’s third conceptual
shift, is usually pitched in terms of improved health care outcomes for individuals. The
benefit to the government is the way health information networks enable the monitoring and
measurement of the national health system performance.
On the matter of secondary uses of medical data Magnusson is very clear. Under the initial
patient-centred model the use of a patient’s health information for secondary purposes can be
considered extraordinary. His prediction for the future direction of secondary uses is
foreboding for privacy advocates:
‘The mother of all “function creeps”, but only likely to become increasingly
apparent over the next decade or so is the gradual absorption of patients’ health
records within a broader public health infrastructure whose goals explicitly include
the protection and promotion of population health’. (Magnusson 2004, 686)
In this final trans-organisational concept Magnusson anticipates strong pressure for a
surveillance architecture permitting linkages between health systems, environmental,
demographic and socio-economic surveillance data – thus truly achieving the Orwellian
future feared by privacy advocates. The broader, more recent research of M.G. and Katina
Michael (Michael and Michael 2010) reflects on the need to carefully consider the adoption of
new technologies and perhaps “ ... reject its rampant application and diffusion without studied
consideration as to the potential effects and consequences.” The notions of Uberveillance
posited by M.G. and Katina Michael resonate with the future envisioned by Magnusson.

CURRENT AUSTRALIAN POSITION
The HIA is moving Australian society towards Magnusson’s third conceptual shift of TransOrganisational Health Data Flows. Writing in 2004, Magnusson anticipated that it would take
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almost a decade to see evidence of the conceptual shifts. To date discussions and justifications
for creation of healthcare identifiers and EHR have largely focussed on the potential, positive
aspects associated with improved health care. Adopting a broader view Magnusson draws our
attention to uses beyond direct healthcare, including performance monitoring by governments.
The notion of monitoring Australian health system performance is currently under debate in
the Medical Journal of Australia (Braithwaite and Mannion 2011; Jorm and Frommer 2011).
Individual and Provider Identifiers are fundamental building blocks of the information
systems that provide the vast volumes of data needed for corporate and trans-organisational
and national performance monitoring.
The next section of this paper compares and contrasts the Identifier Principle of the ALRC
UPPs and the 2010 Healthcare Identifiers Act. This enables a multi-dimensional perspective
to allow reflection on both the immediate EHR drivers and broader societal impact.

IDENTIFIERS - ALRC PRIVACY PRINCIPLES
In developing the proposed UPPs, the ALRC considered many aspects of privacy in the
Australian context including: the background to privacy regulation; achieving national
consistency; regulating privacy; impacts of developing technology on privacy and associated
matters. ALRC Recommendation 30.3, clarifies the term ‘Identifier’:
‘The ‘Identifiers’ principle should define ‘identifier’ inclusively to mean a number,
symbol or biometric information that is collected for the purpose of automated
biometric identification or verification that:
(a) uniquely identifies or verifies the identity of an individual for the purpose of
an agency’s operations; or
(b) is determined to be an identifier by the Privacy Commissioner’
On the issue of the Identifiers Principle the ALRC states
‘It is not desirable for organisations to refer to individuals by an identifier that is
assigned by an agency, nor is it desirable to facilitate data-matching between
agencies and organisations through the use of an identifier’. (ALRC 2008, Vol2,
1029)
It is clear here that the ALRC is warning that organisations should not be allowed to adopt
unique, individual identifiers that have been allocated by Government agencies. Allowing
numerous organisations to adopt the same Government generated unique, individual identifier
enables data from disparate organisations information systems to be readily linked. The level
of individual surveillance and secondary data use that is possible with such architectures is for
many members of society quite alarming – hence the ALRC strong position here.
The development of national identity numbers is not a notion endorsed in any way by the
ALRC, published discussion specifically refers to preventing the creation of de facto national
identifiers:
‘The policy objectives underlying the recommended ‘Identifiers’ principle—
preventing an identifier that is assigned by an agency from becoming a de facto
national identity number, and restricting the use of an identifier to facilitate data
matching programs—are also relevant to the handling of identifiers by agencies’.
(ALRC 2008, 1034)
The Australian Privacy Commissioner provided a concise description of the importance of
identifiers in a submission to the ALRC,
‘The privacy risks of sharing unique identifiers are not always immediate. The risks
accumulate as more organisations or agencies adopt the number for their own
purposes, and as greater amounts of otherwise unrelated personal information
become associated with that number. Accordingly, individuals may not always be
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conscious of the inherent risks of consenting to incrementally greater uses of their
unique identifier’. (ALRC 2008, Vol2, 1047)
Moving on from the UPPs the Companion Guide to the Australian Privacy Principles (2010)
provides very clear guidance on the use of identifiers issued by government agencies via
Australian Privacy Principle 9 – adoption, use or disclosure of government related identifier:
‘This principle is aimed at ensuring that organisations (not agencies) do not refer to
individuals within their own systems according to identifiers (for example,
Medicare numbers) issued by government agencies. Further, it prevents the
facilitation of unlawful data-matching by organisations through use and disclosure
of such identifiers.
The key goal of this principle is to restrict general use of identifiers issued by
government agencies and prevent such identifiers from becoming de facto national
identity numbers’. (Companion Guide APPs 2010, 11)
The substantial consultation undertaken by the ALRC in the development of the Model UPPs
and subsequent progress to Exposure Australian Privacy Principles indicates a real
engagement with the issue of privacy in the Information Age. There is a recognition that
adoption of information and communication technologies is not always in the best interests of
individuals as they inevitably leave electronic footprints through their day-to-day activities.
The notion of undesirable citizen surveillance is acknowledged by the ALRC and prevention
of such is a clear objective throughout its three-volume report (ALRC 2008) and Exposure
Australian Privacy Principle 9.

IDENTIFIERS - 2010 HEALTHCARE IDENTIFIERS ACT
The Healthcare identifiers and privacy: Discussion paper on proposals for legislative
support was issued by the Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council in July 2009. This
paper described legislative proposals to support the creation and implementation of Australian
national healthcare identifiers and associated arrangements for privacy of health information.
Included in this proposal is the creation of an Individual Healthcare Identifier (IHI) for every
Australian.
The Discussion Paper puts forward the case for establishment of the national healthcare
identifiers with the associated Health Identifier Service expected to be operational by mid
2010. As noted in the Executive Summary to the Discussion Paper:
“Discussions between governments about a national privacy framework across all
jurisdictions and its implementation may not be completed by that time”. (Discussion Paper
2009, 3) This is a lost opportunity for consumers as a stable, well established national privacy
framework would have been advantageous for consumers both now and in the future as the
identifiers are more widely adopted.
The Discussion Paper stated that “assignment of IHIs will be authorised by legislation and
individual consent will not be sought”. (Discussion Paper 2009, 25) The arguments for this
are sound from an information systems point of view, that is from the outset the health data
management goals would be best served by a complete, valid and comprehensive set of
individual identifiers. Assigning health care identifiers on a voluntary basis is rejected in the
Discussion Paper as it “...would create numerous implementation problems and complexities,
placing increased burden on healthcare providers and consumers, and resulting in poor
uptake”. (Discussion Paper 2009, 11) Authors of the Discussion Paper go on to state that
“Limited or inconsistent uptake will mean that many of the efficiency gains for health care
providers and important quality and safety benefits for patients will not be realised.”
(Discussion Paper 2009, 11)
This approach can be seen as very ‘heavy-handed’ and somewhat paternalistic and an ‘optout’ option for Australian consumers who did not wish to participate in the de facto national
identifiers could also have been supported from a privacy-protective perspective. Arguments
against the failed Australia Card are pertinent here but will not be revisited in this paper.
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The Discussion Paper also explains that healthcare providers will be given approval to adopt
the new Individual Healthcare Identifiers in their health information systems. This suggestion
is in direct conflict with the ALRC policy objective, UPP 10 and APP 9 that prevents the
adoption of such identifiers due to concern regarding data linkage and the future potential for
surveillance. This is also in direct conflict with the risks raised by the Australian Privacy
Commissioner, as presented above, where the issues with shared identifier use are not initially
obvious but become more apparent over time with broader adoption by a growing number of
organisations.
The Discussion Paper also acknowledges that this aspect of the Healthcare Identifier proposal
is at odds with the Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988:
‘Specific authority will be given to private sector healthcare provider organisations
to adopt, use or disclose and IHI or HPI-I for health information management and
communication purposes. This is to overcome a restriction in the present
Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988’. (Discussion Paper 2009, 3).
The draft Exposure Healthcare Identifiers Bill was available for scrutiny and comment across
the Christmas-New Year period from mid-December 2009 to 7 Jan 2010. The brief
consultation across the traditional holiday period was not ideal for consumer engagement. The
2010 Healthcare Identifiers Act was enacted in July 2010 with all Australians allocated a 16
digit unique identifier.
Within the HIA, Division 3 Section 25 Adoption by healthcare, authorises healthcare
providers to use the national identifier within their own information systems:
25 Adoption by healthcare provider
A healthcare provider is authorised to adopt the healthcare identifier of a healthcare
recipient (including a healthcare identifier disclosed to the healthcare provider for
any purpose under section 24) as the healthcare provider’s own identifier of the
healthcare recipient.
Using this de facto national identifier as a possible primary key or foreign key within
healthcare provider’s disparate information systems could at a later date readily facilitate data
linkage and surveillance. The impact of this on future Australian society is alarming yet this
legislation has passed fairly quietly through Federal Parliament.
There is a note in the legislation attached to this section that states that this approval only
relates to the identifier not the associated consumer personal health information. The
associated health information is to be dealt with by ‘other’ legislation including the Privacy
Act 1988. When using information technology it is the identifier that is needed for linkage
and it is somewhat inadequate to refer back to the Privacy Act 1988 seeking protection for the
remainder of the held personal information. Australian researchers have recently noted the
complexity in navigating privacy legislation (O’Keefe and Connolly 2010) and this splitting
of the individual healthcare identifier and the associated medical information between two (or
more) Acts may not assist.
As Magnusson foreshadowed in Concept 3, the gradual absorption of individual’s health
records within a broader public health infrastructure is evident in the HIA. Specifically,
Section 24 Use and disclosure for other purposes authorises release of health identifiers for a
range of secondary purposes including but not limited to: management, funding, monitoring
or evaluation of healthcare; provision of indemnity cover for a healthcare provider; conduct of
research that has been approved by a Human Research Ethics Committee and to lessen or
prevent serious threats to public health. Clearly the healthcare identifiers alone would be
insufficient to facilitate such secondary uses and the associated personal and medical data is
also required.
Within Section 24 the HIA is strengthened by the inclusion of four excluded secondary uses:
Certain purposes excluded
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This section does not authorise the use or disclosure of the healthcare identifier of a
healthcare recipient for the purpose of communicating or managing health
information as part of:
(a) underwriting a contract of insurance that covers the healthcare recipient; or
(b) determining whether to enter into a contract of insurance that covers the
healthcare recipient (whether alone or as a member of a class); or
(c) determining whether a contract of insurance covers the healthcare recipient in
relation to a particular event; or
(d) employing the healthcare recipient.
The exclusion of these secondary purposes reflects Australian consumers concerns regarding
secondary use of medical data by insurance organisations and employers as gathered by a
pilot consumer survey in 2009. (Heath 2010)

CONCLUSIONS
By looking beyond the healthcare drivers that led to the 2010 Healthcare Identifiers Act, it is
possible to recognise that there are broader societal impacts that, as the Privacy Commissioner
and Magnusson have warned, are not always immediately apparent. Ideally the Australian
Privacy Principles (APP) would have been finalised and supported by legislation prior to
tackling the complex issue of creation of Australian Healthcare Identifiers.
Looking to the future we can expect increased interest in secondary uses of Australian
consumers medical data as the adoption of the IHI facilitates linkage of disparate datasets.
Secondary uses include: commercial activities such as those offered by data brokers; medical
research; clinical audit and healthcare administration. Research is currently underway to
explore Australian consumer’s expectations regarding secondary use of their medical data
(Heath 2010). The outcomes of this research should assist by providing consumers voices in
upcoming Government initiatives concerning eHealth and privacy.
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